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MALACK V. BDO SEIDMAN, LLP AND THE FUTURE OF THE
FRAUD-CREATED-THE-MARKET THEORY
Sean M. O’Loughlin

I.

*

INTRODUCTION

Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 with the
underlying philosophy that full disclosure would lead to honest secu1
rities markets. Lacking the expertise to curb the speculation and
dishonest business practices that had become all but ubiquitous by
the stock market crash of 1929 through statute alone, Congress created the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and gave it broad au2
thority over the securities markets. The arterial source of the this authority is the general anti-fraud provision of Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act, which grants the SEC the authority to prescribe rules
to combat deceptive practices in connection with the sale or purchase
3
of a security. In 1942, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 as a means
*

J.D., May 2012, Seton Hall University School of Law. B.S., 2006, Loyola University Maryland.
1
H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 11 (1934) (“There cannot be honest markets without
honest publicity. Manipulation and dishonest practices of the market place thrive
upon mystery and secrecy.”). The legislation fundamentally aimed to “substitute a
philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve
a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry.” SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
2
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78(d) (2006); see also Steve
Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 385, 461 (1990) (arguing that Congress intended to give the SEC much more
authority than the Supreme Court later interpreted the Exchange Act to convey).
3
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). Section
10(b) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange—
....
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not
so registered, or any securities-based swap agreement (as defined in
section 206B of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
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4

to carry out Congress’s charge. The rule prohibits a person from
employing a plan to defraud, making any material misrepresentations
or omissions, or from engaging in any fraudulent act in connection
5
with a purchase or sale of a security. Although Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 do not explicitly authorize private suits, federal courts first
6
recognized such a right in 1946, and the Supreme Court later
7
acknowledged the same. Since that time, private suits have dominat8
ed federal court securities litigation.
Private 10b-5 litigation evolved despite Congress’s and the SEC’s
9
reticence. Struggling to define the rule’s scope and limitations,
courts borrowed from the common-law tort actions of deceit and mis10
representation. Six elements have emerged that a plaintiff generally
must articulate to state a valid Rule 10b-5 claim: (1) a material misrepresentation (or omission) (2) made knowingly (i.e., defendant
acted with scienter) (3) in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security where (4) the plaintiff’s reliance on the misrepresentation or

Id.
4

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
6
See Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513–14 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
7
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230–31 (1988) (“Judicial interpretation
and application, legislative acquiescence, and the passage of time have removed any
doubt that a private cause of action exists for a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 . .
. .”).
8
See Thel, supra note 2, at 462.
9
See Julie A. Herzog, Fraud Created the Market: An Unwise and Unwarranted Extension of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 360 n.5 (1995)
(“[P]rivate actions under Rule 10b-5 . . . [are] a judicial oak which [have] grown
from little more than a legislative acorn.” (alterations in original) (quoting Blue
Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
10
See Robert A. Prentice, Stoneridge, Securities Fraud Litigation, and the Supreme
Court, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 611, 652 n.183 (2008) (“[J]udicially implied private securities
fraud actions resemble in many (but not all) respects common-law deceit and misrepresentation action.” (quoting Dura Pharms, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42
(2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
5
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omission (5) was the proximate cause of (6) the plaintiff’s economic
11
loss.
One of the most debated elements is that of reliance (which is
12
often combined with causation and collapsed into a single inquiry).
Traditionally, a plaintiff would satisfy this element by showing that
some form of disclosure or nondisclosure amounts to a material misrepresentation, and that the misrepresentation influenced the indi13
vidual plaintiff’s investment decision. Noting the difficulty in proving direct reliance in modern securities markets, however, courts
14
eventually came to presume reliance in certain circumstances.
One of these presumptions is based on a theory known as the
“fraud created the market.” First articulated by the Fifth Circuit in
Shores v. Sklar, the theory presupposes that were it not for the issuer’s
15
intentional fraud, the security would not have been marketable.
That is, investors are able to rely on a security’s availability in the
market as evidence that the security is marketable. If the standard is
met, investors can evade the traditional requirement of proving direct reliance on the issuer’s fraud in making the investment deci16
sion.
The Fifth Circuit’s decision is a controversial one. Some courts
have accepted the fraud-created-the-market theory (at least in some
17
variation); others have rejected it entirely. The theory was most recently addressed in Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, a case arising from a
18
bond issuance that led to substantial investor losses. After the issuer
went bankrupt and the notes were rendered worthless, the plaintiff
19
sued and sought class certification. The plaintiff did not allege that
the investors relied on the defendant’s allegedly fraudulent conduct

11

See, e.g., Broudo, 544 U.S. at 341–42. While the scope of this Comment is restricted to the reliance requirement, all of the 10b-5 elements have been contested
and the Supreme Court has addressed many of them. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson,
485 U.S. 224 (1988) (materiality); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 245 U.S. 185 (1976)
(scienter); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (in connection with the purchase or sale of a security); Dura Pharms, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S.
336 (2005) (causation).
12
See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 160
(2008).
13
See Herzog, supra note 9, at 361.
14
See infra Part II.B.
15
647 F.2d 462, 469–70 (5th Cir. 1981).
16
Id. at 469.
17
See infra Part II.C–D.
18
617 F.3d 743 (3d Cir. 2010).
19
Id. at 744.
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20

when purchasing the notes. Instead, he argued for a presumption
21
of reliance under the fraud-created-the-market theory. Specifically,
the plaintiff alleged that were it not for the defendant’s fraud, the
notes would not have been marketable and therefore would not and
22
23
could not have been purchased. The Third Circuit disagreed. In
what is perhaps the most vigorous rejection of the theory to date, the
24
court rejected the fraud-created-the-market theory in its entirety.
The Malack decision widened the current circuit split and thus invites
a reexamination of the reliance requirement and the validity of the
25
presumptions that have attached to it.
Part II of this Comment discusses the background and development of Rule 10b-5 private actions, presumptions of reliance, and the
fraud-created-the-market theory. Part III discusses and analyzes the
Malack decision and the rationale behind the Third Circuit’s rejection of the theory. Finally, Part IV argues that the Supreme Court
should resolve the circuit split by endorsing a narrow form of the
fraud-created-the-market theory. By doing so, the Court could resolve the split by eliminating some of the theory’s problems while
maintaining an effective avenue for investor relief. The Supreme
Court should prefer such a conciliatory course of action as opposed
to rejecting the theory altogether.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Reliance Requirement
To state a valid 10b-5 claim, the plaintiff must have relied on a
material misstatement or omission in making the investment deci26
sion. Reliance is essential because it “provides the requisite causal
connection between a defendant’s misrepresentation and a plaintiff’s
27
injury.” The requirement further ensures that the Exchange Act’s
philosophy of full disclosure is carried out and that diligent investors
28
use those disclosures to make informed decisions.
20

Id. at 745.
Id. at 749.
22
Id. at 745.
23
Id. at 749.
24
Malack, 617 F.3d at 756.
25
See infra Part II.C–D.
26
See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988).
27
Id.
28
AES Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 325 F.3d 174, 178 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that the
reliance requirement ensures that “the plaintiff exercised the diligence that a rea21
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Neither Section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 contains a reliance requirement. Federal courts have instead embraced common-law fraud
29
elements in imposing a reliance requirement on a 10b-5 action. Satisfying the requirement in early 10b-5 cases was particularly burdensome. Generally, a plaintiff had to show that he had read and relied
upon the disclosure materials of the security, such as a prospectus or
annual statement, and that the materials contained a material mis30
representation or omission.
This intentionally onerous standard
acted as a bulwark against excessive litigation. Indeed, courts and
commentators have noted the importance of maintaining the direct
reliance requirement in order to prevent private 10b-5 litigation from
becoming a form of “investor’s insurance” that reimburses investors
31
who have merely made a bad decision. Perhaps adapting to an evolving financial landscape, courts have nonetheless deemed the direct
reliance requirement an unreasonable evidentiary burden, and, in
certain situations, will forego the traditional standard and presume
32
reliance instead.
B. Established Presumptions of Reliance
The Supreme Court has expressly adopted two presumptions of
33
reliance—the first in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, the second
34
in Basic Inc. v. Levinson.
1.

Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States

Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States marks the Supreme Court’s
first departure from the requirement of direct reliance. Two bank
employees, whose employer acted as transfer agent for the security at
35
issue, induced the plaintiffs to sell their stock. As a result, the plaintiffs captured a price lower than market value, and subsequently alsonable person under all of the circumstances would have exercised to protect his
own interests” (citing Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 597–98 (3d Cir. 1976)).
29
Basic, 485 U.S. at 243; see also Prentice, supra note 10, at 562; John A.
MacKerron, The Price Integrity Cause of Action Under Rule 10b-5: Limited and Expanding
the Use of the Fraud on the Market Theory, 69 OR. L. REV. 177, 184 (1990).
30
See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 180 (1994)
(“Allowing plaintiffs to circumvent the reliance requirement would disregard the
careful limits on Rule 10b-5 recovery mandated by our earlier cases.”); Peil v. Speiser,
806 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1986) (discussing theories of reliance).
31
Basic, 485 U.S. at 251–52 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
see also Herzog, supra note 9, at 362–63.
32
See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975).
33
406 U.S. 128 (1972).
34
485 U.S. 224 (1988).
35
Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 153.
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leged that the employees withheld, for personal gain, information
36
about the market for the security. The Court agreed and found the
defendants liable for failing to disclose material information appur37
tenant to the sale. Noting that Rule 10b-5 requires some flexibility,
the Court implicitly recognized the difficulty that a plaintiff faces in
38
trying to prove that he relied on an omission or a failure to disclose.
As a result, courts will now presume reliance in face-to-face transactions when the nondisclosure or omission encouraged the purchase
39
or sale of a security.
Courts that have analyzed the Affiliated Ute presumption have
held that the presumption is rebuttable notwithstanding the Supreme
40
Court’s silence on the issue. A defendant is thus given the opportunity to show that the nondisclosure did not affect the plaintiff’s investment decision by proving, for example, that the plaintiff never
read the offering materials and therefore would not have been influ41
enced by the information had it been proffered.
2.

Basic Inc. v. Levinson and the Fraud-on-the-Market
Theory

The second Supreme Court-endorsed presumption of reliance is
based on what is known as the fraud-on-the-market theory. The
Ninth Circuit, in Blackie v. Barrack, was the first court to articulate this
42
theory. The Supreme Court later adopted it in Basic Inc. v. Levin43
son. Unlike Affiliated Ute, which involved fraudulent nondisclosures,
the fraud-on-the-market theory applies to affirmative misrepresenta44
tions.

36

Id.
Id. at 153 (“The defendants may not stand mute while they facilitate the mixedbloods’ sales . . . . The sellers had the right to know that the defendants were in a
position to gain financially from their sales and that their shares were selling for a
higher price in the market.”).
38
See Basic, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988).
39
Herzog, supra note 9, at 365.
40
See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159
(2008); Black v. Finantra Capital, Inc., 418 F.3d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 2005); DuPont v.
Brady, 828 F.2d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1987); Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402,
410 (3d Cir. 1974).
41
Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 468 (5th Cir. 1981).
42
524 F.2d 891, 905–09 (9th Cir. 1975).
43
485 U.S. 224, 241–49 (1988).
44
Blackie, 524 F.2d at 907–08.
37
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The presumption is based on the notion that an investor relies
45
on the integrity of the market when making an investment decision.
To avail herself of the presumption, a plaintiff must satisfy three requirements: (1) the information in question must have been material, (2) the market must have been efficient (i.e., open and developed), and (3) the misinformation must have been disseminated
46
publicly. Using common stock as an example, the theory assumes
that in an efficient market, a company’s share price represents the
monetary value of all of the information that is available and accessi47
ble to investors. Good news might cause the shares to increase in
value; bad news might send the stock tumbling. Misrepresentations
or false statements that reach the open market will similarly affect
share price. Thus, the misrepresentation could injure a buyer or seller of the stock, irrespective of whether that misrepresentation actual48
ly factored into the investment decision.
In Basic, a corporation made three public statements denying
the possibility of a merger, only to complete the merger a few months
49
later. Former shareholders brought a class action suit under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, alleging that the false denials resulted in an ar50
tificially-low stock price at the time of sale. In other words, had the
company acknowledged that a merger was imminent, the shareholders would have captured a higher price.
45

Basic, 485 U.S. at 245.
4 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.10
(6th ed. 2009); see also JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 704–06 (6th ed.
2009). See generally Barbara Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with
Reliance Requirements in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 435 (1984);
Barbara Black, The Strange Case of Fraud on the Market: A Label in Search of A Theory, 52
ALB. L. REV. 923 (1988).
47
Basic, 485 U.S. at 241. The Court noted that the economic underpinning of
the theory, known as the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis, garners support from
empirical studies and economic analysis. Id. at 246, 247 n.24. Generally, the hypothesis maintains that investors’ and market professionals’ evaluation of all public
information regarding a stock will form the stock’s price. HAZEN, supra note 46, §
12.10. For a more detailed analysis of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, see
MacKerron, supra note 29.
48
Basic, 485 U.S. at 242. To invoke the presumption, a plaintiff must allege that:
The defendants made public misrepresentations;
The misrepresentations were material in that they would induce a reasonable relying investor to misjudge the value of the share;
The shares were traded in an efficient market; and
The plaintiff traded the shares between the time the misrepresentations were made and the time the truth was revealed.
Basic, 485 U.S. at 248, n.27.
49
Id. at 227–28.
50
Id. at 228.
46

O'LOUGHLIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/14/2012 2:28 PM

800

[Vol. 42:793

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Under the traditional reliance requirement, each member of the
Basic plaintiff class would have had to prove that she relied on the
corporation’s denials when making the decision to sell in order to
51
certify the class. For a stock with many shareholders, this would
prove quite difficult. Accordingly, the Court found that a presumption of reliance existed under the fraud-on-the-market theory and the
class action could proceed despite the absence of individualized reli52
ance.
Justice Blackmun’s opinion emphasized the difficulty that a
53
plaintiff class would face without the presumption. Because class
certification under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires
54
common questions to predominate over individual questions, each
class member would have to prove individual reliance on the misrepresentations, and all reliance arguments would have to share some
55
form of commonality. Such a requirement would create an unreasonable evidentiary burden, especially in light of the modern and
largely anonymous securities markets that handle millions of trades
56
daily. This would not only preclude investor recovery but might also
act as an impetus for a company to engage in fraudulent activity.
Although Basic represents a substantial gain for investors, the
57
fraud-on-the-market presumption is rebuttable. The Court articulated a number of ways in which a defendant would go about “sever[ing] the link between the alleged misrepresentation and either
the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at
a fair market price,” including showing that the market price would
not have been affected by the misrepresentations, that the truthful
merger discussions were disseminated into the market, or that the investor knew that the merger denial was false but sold the stock any58
way.
The fraud-on-the-market theory and the Affiliated Ute presumption are particularly helpful to plaintiffs seeking relief under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. In Affiliated Ute, the Court recognized the difficulty plaintiffs would face in trying to prove they relied on an omis-

51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Id. at 242.
Id. at 250.
Id. at 243.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2), (b)(3).
Basic, 485 U.S. at 242.
Id. at 243.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 248–49.
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59

sion. In Basic, the Court similarly recognized the evidentiary burden
that traditional reliance requirements would impose on a plaintiff
60
class. As a result, a plaintiff can generally forego the traditional reliance requirement if she can show that the circumstances surrounding
61
the investment decision fit into one of the two presumptions.
C. The Fraud-Created-the-Market Theory
The protections that the Affiliated Ute and Basic presumptions
cast over investors do not extend to securities being issued (i.e., the
62
primary market) or to inefficient (e.g., thinly-traded) markets. Imagine, for example, that an investor bought bonds from a corporation
wishing to raise capital. The disclosure literature that was distributed
with the bond offering contained fraudulent information, and the
bond subsequently lost its value. The two reliance presumptions provide the investor no relief: the Affiliated Ute presumption is inapplicable outside of a failure to disclose and the fraud-on-the-market theory
requires an efficient market. An efficient market is one in which
63
regular trading occurs —an element lacking in the primary market.
To bring a Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claim, then, the investor
would need to prove that he directly relied on the misrepresentation
in the disclosure materials. This would make class certification a near
impossibility.
Some courts have responded to this dilemma by employing a
64
third presumption of reliance in a primary-market context. The
Fifth Circuit was the first court to expressly endorse this presump65
tion. In Shores, a mobile-home manufacturer and proposed under66
writer persuaded a town board to issue revenue bonds. The bonds
funded the construction of an industrial facility, which the manufacturer leased in order to conduct operations, and the manufacturer’s
67
rent payments were to be used to pay the interest on the bonds.
The plaintiff had purchased three municipal bonds from the offe-

59

See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text.
61
See Herzog, supra note 9, at 373.
62
See Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market
Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 901 n.170 (1992).
63
See HAZEN, supra note 46, § 12.10.
64
See infra Part II.C.1–3.
65
See Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981).
66
Id. at 465.
67
Id.
60
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68

ror. Less than a year and a half after the initial offering, the manufacturer defaulted on its rental payments and the value of the bonds
69
dropped precipitously.
Investors recovered approximately thirty70
seven percent of their original investment. The plaintiff alleged that
the offering circular, drafted by the bond counsel Sklar, contained
71
material misrepresentations and omissions.
Although a plaintiff in this situation could typically invoke the
Affiliated Ute presumption to encompass the material information that
was omitted from the offering circular, here, the plaintiff admitted
72
that he was not aware of the offering circular. Thus, the plaintiff
foreclosed use of the Affiliated Ute presumption—essentially performing the defendant’s job of rebutting the presumption—by admitting
that he had not relied on the fraudulent documents. For this reason,
73
the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants.
The Fifth Circuit vacated, however, paving the way for a new pre74
sumption of reliance.
The Court of Appeals held that the issuers’ fraud was an “elaborate scheme” that went beyond the misrepresentations and omissions
75
contained in the offering circular. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient under parts (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5, which
76
use broad terms to define the actionable activity. The scheme was
deemed to be so pervasive that, without it, the bonds would not have
77
been offered on the market at any price. Thus, just as in the case of
78
the fraud-on-the-market theory, the plaintiff was relying on the in68

Id. at 467.
Id. at 463–64, 464 n.1.
70
See id. at 464 n.1.
71
Shores, 647 F.2d at 465–66. Indeed, the court found some of these misrepresentations and nondisclosures to be quite egregious. For example, the circular failed
to mention that an SEC investigation and civil action was proceeding against the
proposed underwriter and misrepresented the financial soundness of the manufacturer and its shareholder. Id.
72
Id. at 468.
73
Id. at 464.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 468.
76
Section (a) of the Rule prohibits the employment of a “scheme” to defraud;
section (c) prohibits any “act” that operates as a fraud; section (b) requires reliance
on a specific statement or omission and thus was eliminated as an avenue for relief
when the plaintiff admitted to not having read the offering material. 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (2012).
77
Shores, 647 F.2d at 463–64 n.2.
78
The similarities and differences between the two theories have generated significant debate between the circuits. See infra Part IV.
69
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tegrity of the market in making the investment decision and not a
79
specific statement or omission by the defendant. That is, the security’s availability in the marketplace allowed the plaintiff to presume its
genuineness. The major difference, however, is that the fraudcreated-the-market theory applies to primary markets, whereas the
fraud-on-the-market theory is restricted to efficient secondary mar80
kets.
The court articulated three requirements that a plaintiff must
show in order to be entitled to the presumption: (1) the defendants
knowingly conspired to bring securities that were not entitled to be
marketed onto the market intending to defraud the purchaser, (2)
the plaintiff reasonably relied on the security’s availability in the market as an indication of the security’s apparent genuineness, and (3) as
81
a result of the scheme to defraud, the plaintiff suffered a loss.
The fraud-created-the-market theory, as envisioned by the Shores
court, arguably sets a higher threshold than the fraud-on-the-market
theory—merely affecting share price will not do; the fraud has to be
82
so significant as to make the security totally unmarketable. But just
what does “not entitled to be marketed” mean? Shores failed to elabo83
rate. Hence, courts analyzing the fraud-created-the-market theory
have necessarily focused on the first requirement of the Shores test.
Courts have interpreted this concept differently, and three main vari84
ations have emerged.
1.

Legal Unmarketability

Legal unmarketability focuses on whether a regulatory agency or
issuing municipality would have been required to prevent the security
from being issued had it known about the misrepresentation or omis85
sion. T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel Au-

79

Shores, 647 F.2d at 471.
Id. at 469–70; see also supra note 46 and accompanying text.
81
Shores, 647 F.2d at 469–70.
82
Id. at 470.
83
See Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 735 (11th Cir. 1989) (Tjoflat, J.,
concurring) (“Marketability, as envisioned by the Shores court, is an elusive concept.”).
84
There has been some confusion and overlap regarding the three types of unmarketability in the Circuits. For purposes of this comment, the author adopts the
terms as the Third Circuit articulated them. See Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617
F.3d 743, 748 (3d Cir. 2010).
85
Id. (quoting Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 1160 (6th Cir.
1994)).
80
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thority is the seminal legal unmarketability case. There, the plaintiff,
a broker-dealer distributing the defendants’ bonds, alleged that the
defendants never intended to use the bond proceeds to construct a
87
gas distribution facility, as they had claimed. The plaintiff further
alleged that the bond counsel concealed this fact during the offering,
88
and that the bonds were not issued pursuant to Oklahoma law.
The Tenth Circuit, adopting the reasoning set forth in Shores,
held that even though federal or state regulators do not consider the
truthfulness of representations made in an offering circular, an inves89
tor should be able to assume that the securities were lawfully issued.
Thus, because the plaintiff established that the defendant was prohibited from issuing the bonds under Oklahoma law, the bonds were
90
unmarketable and the court affirmed the class certification. Although the court described the fraud-created-the-market theory as an
extension of the fraud-on-the-market theory that the Supreme Court
endorsed in Basic, the court significantly limited its holding to the
narrow grounds that reliance can be presumed only for securities that
91
were issued in contravention of some state or federal law.
The
Tenth Circuit therefore equated “not entitled to be marketed” with
illegality. This holding refines the Shores standard and distinguishes
the Tenth Circuit from other courts that would later apply their own
92
variation of the fraud-created-the-market presumption.
2.

Economic Unmarketability

Economic unmarketability directs the inquiry to whether the security is “patently worthless” such that no investor would buy the se93
curity. This is arguably the original standard that the Fifth Circuit

86

717 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1331.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 1333.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
In Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1164 (10th Cir. 2000), the Tenth Circuit affirmed its legal unmarketability standard but also discussed economic unmarketability. The court did not rule on the validity of economic unmarketability because the
plaintiff failed to meet the requirements, but the opinion implies that the court
might allow it under different circumstances. See id.
93
Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743, 748 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting
Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 1160 (6th Cir. 1994))(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ross v. South Bank, N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 736 (11th Cir.
1989) (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (“[T]he majority today focuses on what I term the economic unmarketability of the bonds: could the bonds, because of the enormous risk
87
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94

first put forth in Shores.
There, the court noted that the fraudcreated-the-market theory cannot be satisfied merely by showing that
95
the fraud caused the security to be issued at an aberrant price; the
plaintiff must show instead that the security would never have been
96
issued “at any price.” That is, the security must be patently worthless.
The economic unmarketability standard has generated controversy since its Shores beginnings. Critics have doubted whether a se97
curity can ever be so flawed that it could not be offered at any price.
Indeed, applying this worthlessness standard to Shores arguably casts
doubt on the court’s holding because the plaintiffs recovered approx98
imately thirty-seven percent of their initial investment. Thus, the
bonds were not patently worthless and could have been issued at
some price—namely, thirty-seven percent of the original offering.
Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit later followed Shores by applying
99
the economic unmarketability standard in Ross v. South Bank, N.A.
Perhaps responding to the problems associated with valuing the
worth of a security, the Fifth Circuit later refined the economic un100
marketability standard in Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co. There, the court
opined that the Supreme Court’s decision in Basic allows the circuit
courts to formulate their own tests to meet the reliance presump101
Consequently, the court held that the presumption is only
tion.
available “where the promoters knew that the subject enterprise was
worthless when the securities were issued, and successfully issued the

of nonpayment, have been brought onto the market at any combination of price and
interest rate if the true risk of nonpayment had been known?”).
94
See Herzog, supra note 9, at 379.
95
Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 470 (5th Cir. 1981).
96
Id. at 464 n.2.
97
See Ross, 885 F.2d at 736 (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (“[N]o matter how great the
risk of nonpayment, a bond can virtually always be sold at some combination of price
and interest rate . . . . [A] bond can never be completely worthless . . . . [Economic
unmarketability] creates a test that in both theory and practice cannot be met . . . .”);
Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1122 (5th Cir. 1988) (“[S]aleable assets
may bless even the most worthless enterprise.”).
98
Shores, 647 F.2d at 464 n.1.
99
885 F.2d 723 (11th Cir. 1989). The Eleventh Circuit, an offspring of the former Fifth Circuit, adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions handed
down prior to October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209
(11th Cir. 1981).
100
Abell, 858 F.2d at 1122.
101
Id. at 1120.
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102

securities only because of the defendants’ fraudulent scheme.”
This revision focuses on the intent of the promoter.
3.

Factual Unmarketability

The third form of unmarketability is factual unmarketability.
This approach focuses on whether a regulatory body or agency would
have prevented the security from coming to market at its actual price
and interest rate had it known of the information fraudulently with103
held. Judge Tjoflat, who had previously dissented in Shores, coined
104
the term in his concurrence in Ross v. South Bank, N.A.
He interpreted Shores as setting forth a factual unmarketability test that allows
an investor to rely on a regulatory entity to establish the correct price
105
and interest rate of a newly-issued security.
The factual unmarketability standard relies on the reasoning of
Arthur Young & Co. v. United States Dist. Court, where the court stated
that “the purchaser of an original issue security relies, at least indirectly, on the integrity of the regulatory process and the truth of any
representations made to appropriate agencies and the investors at the
106
time of the original issue.” Thus, factual unmarketability does not
run into the difficulties that economic unmarketability faces because
107
it does not require the security to be worthless. Nor does it require
the security to be issued unlawfully, as is required by legal unmarket108
ability.
Where the standard does face difficulty, however, is in its reliance on a regulatory body. Although factual unmarketability presumably allows an investor to rely on any regulatory entity to police
102

Id. at 1122–23 (emphasis added).
Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743, 748 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Ross,
885 F.2d at 735–36 (Tjoflat, J., concurring)):
[F]actual unmarketability looks to the actual securities issued, and asks
“whether, in the absence of fraud, the securities would have been issued given the actual price and interest rate at which they were issued.
Under this approach, a security is unmarketable if, but for the fraudulent scheme, some ‘regulatory’ entity (whether official or unofficial)
would not have allowed the security to come onto the market at its actual price and interest rate.”
Id.
104
Ross, 885 F.2d at 736 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
105
Id.
106
549 F.2d 686, 695 (9th Cir. 1977).
107
“Even an extraordinarily risky security is entitled to be marketed; but a security
that presumably would never have been issued by an entity but for the fraud is not
‘entitled’ to be on the market.” Ross, 885 F.2d at 736 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
108
See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
103
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the primary markets, it is the SEC that regulates new issues of securi109
ties by requiring issuers to register and disclose certain information.
Relying on the SEC to prevent a fraudulent security from coming to
market is problematic for two reasons. First, the securities laws provide several exemptions to SEC registration; the SEC does not review
110
such exempted securities.
More importantly, while the SEC requires issuers to disclose certain information, the agency does not
111
judge the merits of those disclosures.
The fact that an investor
cannot rely on the SEC to set the correct price for a newly-issued security thus seriously undermines the validity of factual unmarketabil112
ity.
D. Rejections of the Fraud-Created-the-Market Theory
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have failed to recognize the
fraud-created-the-market theory despite having the opportunity to do
so. The Seventh Circuit rejected the theory first in Eckstein v. Balcor
113
Film Investors. The court, repudiating the holding in Shores instead
114
of parsing through the different unmarketability variations, held
that full disclosure does not keep a security from being marketed but
115
may merely lower its price.
The court held that “the linchpin of
Shores—that disclosing bad information keeps securities off the market, entitling investors to rely on the presence of the securities just as
116
they would rely on statements in a prospectus—is simply false.”
The Seventh Circuit limited its holding to rejecting Shores and
thus left open the possibility that it would recognize the fraud117
created-the-market theory under different facts.
That is, had the
issuer known that the securities were worthless or had the securities

109

See HAZEN, supra note 46, § 9.2.
See Herzog, supra note 9, at 381.
111
See id.; infra Part IV.
112
See Herzog, supra note 9, at 381.
113
8 F.3d 1121 (7th Cir. 1993). The case involved partnership interests, registered and sold as securities, which declined in value after the issuer’s venture failed.
Id. at 1123. The interests were sold subject to a $35 million floor—the securities
would not be issued if the issuer sold less than that amount. Id. at 1130. A group of
plaintiffs who had not read the prospectus sued on the theory that, but for the misrepresentations and omissions, the investors who had read the prospectus would not
have purchased the securities and the $35-million-floor requirement would not have
been reached. Id. Thus, the securities would not have been issued. Id.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 1131.
116
Id.
117
See id. at 1130.
110
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been issued illegally—thus respectively satisfying the economic unmarketability or legal unmarketability standards—the court’s decision
may have been different.
Following Eckstein, the Sixth Circuit failed to apply the fraudcreated-the-market theory in a class action arising from a bond issu118
ance. In Ockerman, the bonds were issued to finance the construc119
tion and operation of a nursing home.
When the project went
bankrupt, the bond purchasers suffered substantial losses, and the
120
plaintiff sued on behalf of a class of investors.
The plaintiff asked
the court to presume reliance even though some of the investors had
not read the defendant’s offering circular and there was no efficient
121
market for the bonds.
122
The court refused to grant the presumption of reliance.
Although one of the problems with the fraud-created-the-market theory
123
is defining “unmarketability,” the court noted that the plaintiff’s
claim would have failed under either economic or legal unmarketa124
bility.
First, the bonds were not worthless because the defendants
sold the project after it declared bankruptcy (albeit for a fraction of
125
the original issuance price). Second, there was nothing in the record to indicate that the defendants used fraudulent means to issue
126
the bonds illegally. Thus, the plaintiff was not entitled to presume
reliance and instead had to prove that the investors directly relied on
127
the offering circular.
Notably, the court limited its holding to the
128
facts of the case and withheld an absolute rejection of the theory.

118

Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 1161 (6th Cir. 1994). The Sixth
Circuit had previously held that the fraud-on-the-market theory does not apply to inefficient primary markets without expressly ruling on the validity of the fraudcreated-the-market theory. See Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 197,
200 (6th Cir. 1990).
119
Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1153.
120
Id. at 1154.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 1161.
123
Id. at 1160.
124
The court did not mention factual unmarketability.
125
Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1160.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id.
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III. THE MALACK DECISION
A. Overview of the Decision
An analysis of the decisions that have addressed the fraudcreated-the-market theory readily demonstrates the lack of uniformity
129
across the circuits. Some courts have accepted the theory but have
branched out beyond Shores; others have rejected parts of the theory;
130
The Third Circuit
still others have refused to rule on its validity.
inherited this jurisprudential morass when Malack v. BDO Seidman,
131
LLP reached its docket. The court, perhaps in response to the confusion and controversy surrounding the theory, issued the most thorough rejection of the fraud-created-the-market theory to date.
The plaintiff, John Malack, and other investors purchased highyield notes issued by subprime mortgage originator American Business Financial Services, Inc. (“American Business”) between October
132
2002 and January 2005. The notes were non-transferrable and thus
133
did not trade in an efficient market. The notes were also registered
with the SEC, and the defendant BDO Seidman, LLP (“BDO”) provided American Business with audit opinions needed to complete the
134
SEC filings.
135
Three
American Business filed for bankruptcy in early 2005.
years later, Malack sued under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and
136
sought class certification. Malack alleged that the BDO audit opinions were deficient and that, without clean opinions, American Business would not have been able to register the notes with the SEC, the
notes would not have been issued, Malack would have never bought
137
the notes, and there would be no injury.
Malack requested that re138
liance be presumed based on legal unmarketability.
The district
139
court denied the request.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district
court’s denial of class certification, holding that Malack did not show
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

See supra Part II.C–D.
See supra Part II.C–D.
617 F.3d 743 (3d Cir. 2010).
Id. at 744–45.
Id. at 745.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 745–46.
Malack, 617 F.3d at 745.
Id.
Id. at 746.
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140

that the class was entitled to a presumption of reliance. The court
first explained the two presumptions of reliance that the Supreme
141
Court has already endorsed. Next, the court defined and explained
the fraud-created-the-market theory and the three variations of un142
marketability that have emerged post-Shores.
The court then discussed presumptions and the factors that a court should use when
considering whether to grant a presumption; such factors include
common sense, probability that proof of one fact allows for an infer143
ence of another fact, and congressional policies.
According to the court, common sense called for rejecting the
144
The theory’s underlying assumpfraud-created-the-market theory.
tion—that a security’s availability on the market is an indication of its
genuineness—is illogical because none of the entities involved in the
145
security’s issuance guarantee against fraud. The corporate entities
involved in issuing the security—the promoter, underwriter, auditor,
and legal counsel—cannot be relied on to prevent fraud because they
146
are seeking to profit from the issuance. Thus, these entities are self147
interested at best and dishonest at worst.
Relying on entities that
are seeking to profit from the issuance to prevent fraud would therefore be contrary to common sense.
Similarly, the SEC—the entity with which the American Business
notes were registered—cannot be relied on because the agency does
148
not judge the merits of the disclosures associated with an issuance.
Instead, the SEC’s purpose is to ensure full disclosure without focus149
ing on the accuracy of those disclosures. Disclosure of negative information might lead to a reduction in offer price, but not to exclu150
sion from the market.
The notes, therefore, would have been
issued irrespective of whether BDO’s audit was accurate.
151
Probability also supported disallowing the presumption.
The
fact that a security makes it to the market does not permit the infer140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151

Id. at 756.
Id. at 747; see also supra Part II.B.
Malack, 617 F.3d at 747–48.
Id. at 749.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 749–50
Id. at 750.
Malack, 617 F.3d at 750.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 751.
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ence that all securities that become marketable are free from fraud.
Such an inferential leap would lead to an investor’s insurance that
152
eliminates the need for a plaintiff to ever prove reliance. The court
opined that “[a]ny investor who purchases any security could point to
the security’s availability on the market to satisfy the reasonable reli153
ance element of a Section 10(b) claim.”
Moreover, the fraudcreated-the-market theory is not supported by empirical studies and
economic theory. The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, underlying the fraud-on-the-market theory, does not apply to issuances be154
cause primary markets are inefficient.
Probability therefore does
not lend itself to presuming that the bonds are free from fraud merely because they made it to the market.
The Third Circuit also highlighted that the fraud-created-the155
market theory may disserve important policy goals. For one, recent
legislation points towards Congress’s desire to narrow the scope of
156
Section 10(b) liability. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995, for example, mandates stricter requirements for private se157
curities actions. Moreover, creating a form of investor’s insurance
that could be invoked at any time that a security has made it to mar158
Instead of informing investors via
ket is contrary to public policy.
disclosures, such a presumption incentivizes investors to ignore disclosures altogether because presence in the market alone is enough
159
to satisfy the reliance requirement.
In this sense, the theory also
promotes frivolous lawsuits by relieving the plaintiff of an important
evidentiary burden. In turn, plaintiff class certification becomes easi160
er and issuers are pressured to settle claims. This harms all market
161
participants as the overall cost of issuing securities increases. Thus,
the court held that extending Section 10(b) liability is for Congress

152

Id. at 752.
Id.
154
See supra note 47.
155
Malack, 617 F.3d at 752–55.
156
Id. at 754 (citing Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlantica, Inc., 552
U.S. 148, 157 (2008)).
157
S. REP. NO. 104-98 (1995). The PSLRA attempts to establish a stricter loss causation requirement for securities fraud claims and seeks to limit meritless securities
fraud claims. Id. at 4, 23.
158
Malack, 617 F.3d at 752.
159
Id. at 753.
160
Id. at 755.
161
Id.
153
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not the judiciary and refused to adopt the fraud-created-the-market
162
theory.
Despite this outright rejection, the court proceeded to analyze
Malack’s claim that the American Business notes were legally unmar163
ketable.
The claim easily failed this standard because nothing in
the record supported the assertion that American Business or its
notes were illegal, irrespective of whether BDO’s audit was defi164
cient. In other words, there was nothing to stop the securities from
coming to the market. As such, the court refused to presume reli165
ance and it ultimately denied class certification.
B. Discussion
The Malack court gave a thoughtful and thorough explanation
as to why it rejected the fraud-created-the-market theory. Unlike prior circuits that have addressed the issue, the Third Circuit made clear
that it was rejecting the theory as a whole, rather than declining to
166
apply it to certain factual scenarios. This will likely bring welcomed
clarity to lower courts and securities lawyers alike. Despite the absolute rejection, however, Malack’s claim was weak, and the court would
have denied class certification under any of the unmarketability variations articulated in previous cases.
The legal unmarketability standard—perhaps the clearest of the
167
three variations—requires a security to be issued illegally.
Here,
there was no indication or allegation that the American Business
notes were issued contrary to any state or federal law. Similarly, had
the court endorsed economic unmarketability as set forth in Abell,
Malack would have had to show that the notes were patently worthless
168
and that BDO knew the notes were patently worthless.
As noted
above, proving that a bond is worthless imposes a heavy, and perhaps
169
impossible, burden on a plaintiff.
Here, the investors who purchased the American Business notes may have been able to recoup
162

Id. at 754.
Id. at 755–56. It is interesting that the Third Circuit analyzed the T.J. Raney &
Sons legal unmarketability standard despite promulgating a blanket rejection of the
fraud-created-the-market theory. This inevitably invites the question of whether, had
the fraud been more egregious or fit squarely into one of the unmarketability variations, the Court would have decided the case differently.
164
Malack, 617 F.3d at 755–56.
165
Id. at 756. But see supra Part II.D.
166
Malack, 617 F.3d at 755 n.10.
167
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
168
Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1122 (5th Cir. 1988).
169
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
163
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some of their principal after American Business went bankrupt. The
investors could have also been paid interest on the notes up until
bankruptcy. Either scenario would show that the notes were not patently worthless, thereby making an economic unmarketability argument unviable.
The Third Circuit might have presumed reliance under factual
unmarketability if Malack could have shown that, absent the fraud, a
regulatory entity would not have allowed the security to come onto
the market at its actual price and interest rate. In one sense, this is a
fairly easy standard to satisfy because most material misrepresentations or omissions will affect offering price. On the other hand, the
standard is flawed for the same reasons set forth in the opinion—the
SEC does not conduct merit review and the parties issuing the security are self-interested. Because there is no agency or entity passing on
the adequacy of disclosure information, the court cannot presume
reliance.
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE FRAUD-CREATED-THE-MARKET THEORY
The Malack decision widened the circuit split and should
prompt calls for the Supreme Court to address the validity of the
fraud-created-the-market theory. Without guidance from the Supreme Court, lower courts dealing with the issue face the difficult
task of stemming frivolous litigation while maintaining effective avenues for relief where such relief would otherwise prove impossible.
While the Third Circuit decided Malack correctly, the court went too
far in closing off all possibilities of presuming reliance under the
fraud-created-the-market theory.
The Exchange Act’s broad goal of promoting fair markets can170
not be achieved by ensuring full disclosure alone.
While full and
fair disclosure is undoubtedly a central tenet of the Exchange Act, it
should be considered one means of attaining fair and honest mar171
kets. The Supreme Court has espoused the view that securities legislation should be construed “not technically and restrictively, but
172
flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.” To that end, where a
fraudulent scheme is so pervasive and insidious that it renders a security completely unmarketable, individuals should not have to prove
170
See Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 470 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976)) (“The Supreme Court has held that the acts
were designed ‘to protect investors against fraud and . . . to promote ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing.’”).
171
Shores, 647 F.2d at 470.
172
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
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that they meticulously analyzed every detail of a prospectus to satisfy
173
the reliance requirement.
Class certification should be attainable
by a less onerous standard. Although the fraud-created-the-market
theory is an imperfect doctrine and requires some flexibility, the theory provides a plaintiff class with such a standard. In order for it to
be workable, however, the Court must clarify the theory in a way that
limits frivolous litigation.
At the core of the fraud-created-the-market controversy is that
almost every court analyzing the theory has treated it as an extension
174
of the fraud-on-the-market theory.
This reasoning is problematic
because the economic justifications of the fraud-on-the-market theory
175
are inapplicable to the primary market. In an actively-traded securities market, an investor can rely on the market to display all availa176
ble information.
But that market has yet to develop for newlyissued securities like the American Business notes, and the Malack
177
court was correct in pointing out the differences between the two.
If the fraud-created-the-market theory is to survive, then, the Court
must first carefully distinguish between the two theories. The fraudcreated-the-market theory should not be considered an extension of
the fraud-on-the-market theory because the latter is supported by a
rationale that is ill-suited for the primary market. The former can
and should survive in some form, but only if the two theories remain
distinct.
The Supreme Court must also revise and condense the economic, factual, and legal unmarketability variations. The circuit courts
have had difficulty defining unmarketability and, consequently, they
178
have defined and applied the three variations haphazardly. Setting
forth a unified standard will provide investors, issuers, and courts with
the necessary clarity for effective and efficient litigation. Though this
is a better alternative than rejecting the theory completely, the Court
will have to articulate one single standard.
Economic unmarketability is problematic because of the difficul179
ties associated with determining whether a security is worthless. As
173

See Peter J. Dennin, Note, Which Came First, the Fraud or the Market: Is the FraudCreated-the-Market Theory Valid under Rule 10b-5?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2611, 2648
(2001).
174
See supra Part II.C.
175
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
176
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
177
See Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743, 751 n.9 (3d Cir. 2010).
178
See supra Part II.C.1–3.
179
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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Judge Tjoflat pointed out in Ross v. South Bank, N.A., nearly all bonds
180
have some worth.
Moreover, factual unmarketability relies on the
181
existence of an entity conducting merit review that does not exist.
The SEC does not have the capability to verify the accuracy of the offering disclosures for each security being issued, nor is it designed to
182
do so.
It is instead the responsibility of the individual investor to
determine whether the investment is sound given the information
183
provided.
Legal unmarketability offers the best starting point for developing a clear and concise standard that can close the circuit split. It is a
narrow standard that allows an investor to rely only on the fact that a
security was issued legally; the investor can assume that the issuing
184
entities will not act contrary to any state or federal law. Relying on
the issuing entities, as opposed to a regulator such as the SEC, alleviates the merit-regulation problem associated with factual unmarketability.
One problem inherent in a legal unmarketability standard is that
185
investors are in effect relying on self-interested corporate entities.
As such, issuers are not vouching for the lawfulness of the security;
they merely want to get the security to the market for monetary gain.
Critics thus argue that relying on entities involved in an issuance runs
186
contrary to common sense.
Although this criticism is logical, accepting it is to implicitly condone deceitful practices that are conducted to profit from unsuspecting and often underequipped investors. Thus, while relying on self-interested actors might require a
stretch of logic, it allows the promotion of honest and fair markets to
remain the central focus of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. Given
the Court’s flexibility in interpreting the securities laws to reach Congress’s goal, plaintiffs should be able to rely on a security’s legality.
Moreover, the legal unmarketability standard is a high burden to
meet—it requires the plaintiff to prove that the issue was marketed
187
illegally, not merely that it was overpriced. Thus, plaintiffs will necessarily use the presumption in limited circumstances, and this will
180
Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 736 (11th Cir. 1989) (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
181
See id. at 735–36.
182
See Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1165–66 (10th Cir. 2000).
183
See Herzog, supra note 9, at 390.
184
For a discussion of legal marketability, see supra Part II.C.1.
185
Ross, 885 F.2d at 739–41 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
186
See, e.g., Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743, 749–50 (3d Cir. 2010).
187
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.

O'LOUGHLIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/14/2012 2:28 PM

816

[Vol. 42:793

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

hardly lead to the investor’s’ insurance that courts have been loath to
create.
The scienter requirement built into Rule 10b-5 actions provides
an additional protection against creating a form of investor’s’ insur188
ance. Here, the Court can require that a plaintiff seeking the benefit of the fraud-created-the-market theory must show that the defendant issuer knew that it lacked the legal authority to offer the security
but did so anyway. If the plaintiff cannot show an intentional breach
of state or federal law, or the issuer can show that it acted innocently,
the plaintiff cannot avail herself of the presumption and must prove
direct reliance instead.
The Court should also make clear an additional limitation. Like
in the two presumptions of reliance that have preceded the fraud189
created-the-market theory, a defendant should have the opportunity to rebut the presumption. A defendant could accomplish this by
showing that the security was not issued illegally or by showing that
the purchaser knew of the illegality but purchased the security anyway. Such a measure would act to limit frivolous litigation, preserve
the goals of securities laws, and avoid creating a form of investor’s’
insurance.
Thus, the Court might set forth this standard: A plaintiff is entitled to the fraud-created-the-market presumption if she proves that:
(1) the defendant conspired to bring securities to the market intending to defraud purchasers when the defendant knew that the securities were not issued according to state or federal law; (2) the plaintiff
reasonably relied on the security’s availability in the market as an indication that the security was issued legally; and (3) as a result of the
scheme to defraud, the plaintiff suffered a loss.
V. CONCLUSION
The fraud-created-the-market theory is a contentious tool for
private Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 actions. The theory allows
plaintiffs to presume reliance in the primary market and thus allows
for class certification where it would be unattainable otherwise. The
courts of appeals that have addressed the issue have struggled to fit
190
the theory within Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence.
188
See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976). Lower courts have
held that recklessness is sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement in a 10b-5 action. See, e.g., Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 961–62 (5th Cir. 1981) (en
banc).
189
See supra notes 40, 57 and accompanying text.
190
See supra Part II.C.
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With the Malack decision, the Third Circuit joined the circuit split
191
with a decisive rejection of the theory.
Malack should prompt the
Supreme Court to resolve the issue. A resolution is even more important during a time of unprecedented market change and regulatory upheaval.
Abrogating the fraud-created-the-market theory goes too far.
The theory can be a valid mechanism for providing effective relief
from egregious cases of securities fraud. This can only be accomplished, however, by distinguishing the theory from the presumptions
of reliance that have preceded it and by unifying the variations of
unmarketability that have emerged in the lower courts. Further, the
Court must carefully articulate the limitations built into the presumption because such limitations will prevent the flood of frivolous litigation that could accompany a relaxation of the traditional requirement of direct reliance and will avoid rewarding investors for careless
behavior.
Legal unmarketability, first articulated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit, offers the Supreme Court the best starting
point for setting forth a workable standard. Investors should be able
to rely on issuers to market securities that are legal, and issuers
should be held liable for knowingly issuing securities that breach
governmental regulations. It is here that the Court can achieve the
critical balance of providing needed investor relief while upholding
the goals of the securities laws.

191

See supra Part III.

